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a b s t r a c t
The shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) is pervasive among pension funds, due
to demographic changes andmacroeconomic pressures. In DB all risks are borne by the provider, while in
plain vanilla DC all risks are borne by the beneficiary. However, for DC to provide income security some
kind of guarantee is required. A minimum guarantee clause can be modeled as a put option written on
some underlying reference portfolio andwe develop a discretemodel that selects the reference portfolio to
minimize the cost of a guarantee. While the relation DB–DC is typically viewed as a binary one, the model
shows how to price a wide range of guarantees creating a continuum between DB and DC. Integrating
guarantee pricing with asset allocation decision is useful to both pension fund managers and regulators.
The former are given a yardstick to assess if a given asset portfolio is fit-for-purpose; the latter can assess
differences of specific reference funds with respect to the optimal one, signaling possible cases of moral
hazard. We develop the model and report numerical results to illustrate its uses.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Developed and developing countries are currently debating
comprehensive approaches for delivering adequate, sustainable
and safe retirement incomes to their aging populations. Defined
benefit (DB) pension plans, desirable as they may be for retirees,
are not sustainable and shift all the risks to the provider, be it a
corporate employer or future taxpayers. A consensus has emerged
that retirees will ‘‘rely more on complementary retirement
savings’’, European Commission (2012), and we are witnessing a
trend favoring defined contribution (DC) that shift risks to retirees.
To make DC politically acceptable, encourage participation and
increase savings, the retirement incomemust be safe. Hence, some
type of guarantee is needed and success of DC hinges upon the
design of appropriate guarantees. However, the difficulty does not
stop in designing the guarantee. We then need asset allocation
decisions that deliver on the guarantee or appropriate insurance
in case the guarantee cannot be met. These interrelated decisions
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0167-6687/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.need to be ‘‘optimized for their safety and performance’’ in the
words of the European Commission report cited above. Given
the interactions of financial, economic and demographic risks,
a guarantee may fail after all, as much as a ‘‘defined benefit’’
may be modified by government legislation, World Bank (2000).
Complementary retirement plans make failures less likely.
In core-DB the provider commits to a set of rigid promises
and assumes all risks. In DC there is no promise made to the
beneficiary, who assumes all the risks. This is a binary division.
Complementary plans range from DB-lite, i.e., plans with a floor
on minimum benefit, to DC-plus, i.e., defined contribution plans
with some guarantee on the contributionmade during theworking
life. However, ‘‘defined ambition’’ plans – a term coined during the
Dutch pension reform debate of the 2000’s and currently providing
the basis for policy debates in the UK – argue that a tweak to the
binary system cannot solve the problem and requires better risk
sharing to ensure that DC is going to work and be sustainable.
A comprehensive approach views pension plans as a hybrid of
guarantees and ambitions: nominal annuities are guaranteed, but
the degree to which pensions rise in line with prices and wages
depends on the performance of investments of the pension funds.
The Dutch reforms are discussed in Bovenberg and Nijman (2009),
NAPF (2012) provides an overview of risk-sharing issues for the UK
industry, and Smetters (2002) discusses the conversion of public
pensions to DC in the United States.
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guarantee options to compute ex antemark-to-market risk premia
and facilitate risk sharing in the design of guarantees.
1.1. The pensions challenge
The US Census Bureau reports that before baby boomers started
turning 65 in 2010, 11% of the total population was between the
ages of 65 and 84. Thereafter, this age group is projected to reach
18% of the population by 2030, Colby and Ortman (2014). The US
will experience a 45% increase of aging population by 2050. Data
from the EC, European Commission (2012), and the IMF, Carone
and Costello (2006), reveal even bigger challenges in Europe. Older
Europeans are a significant and growing part of the EU population
(24%) and by 2050 it is projected to grow by 77%. The fastest
growing group in the EU are the very elderly (over 80) projected
to grow by 174%, and the old-age dependency ratio is projected to
double to 54%.
At the same period per capita growth rate slides to a projected
1.4%, Carone and Costello (2006) (these are pre-crisis estimates).
Pensions represent a large share of public expenditure: more than
10% of GDP on average today, expected to rise to 12.5% by 2060
in the EU as a whole. Spending on public pensions ranges from
6% of GDP in Ireland to 15% in Italy, so countries are in different
situations although they face similar demographic challenges.
Projected changes between 2004 and 2050 ranges from −5.9%
GDP in Poland to +12.9% GDP in Cyprus. Only three EU members
experience a decrease and ninemembers expect increases over 5%.
According to the EC white paper for ‘‘adequate, safe and
sustainable’’ pensions, European Commission (2012), a majority
of member states have been reforming pension systems to put
them on a more sustainable footing. Shifting from DB to DC is a
significant component of the reforms. Velculescu (2010) reports
that ‘‘on existing [pension] policies, the intertemporal net worth of
the EU27 is deeply negative [....] Europe’s current policies need to
be significantly strengthened to bring future liabilities in line with
the EU governments’ capacity to generate assets’’.
The challenges are not restricted to the US and EU. Latin
American countries were pioneers in pension reforms in the
1990’s; the pricing literature reviewed belowwasmotivated by DC
plans introduced inUruguay, Chile and Colombia. In India, DB plans
were closed by the Government in 2004 and were replaced by a
two-tier DC system. The introduction of DC plans in China appears
to be modest but it represents a very recent and ongoing trend.
The challenges are addressed with a variety of policy tools: bal-
ancing time spent inwork and retirement, enhancing productivity,
indexing replacement rates, supporting the development of com-
plementary retirement savings to enhance retirement incomes.
Shifting away from DB is a way to develop complementary retire-
ment savings and we focus now on DC plans.
1.2. Type of guarantees
A survey of 1700 organizations in the nine largest EU
economies, found 22% of the respondent’s undergoing pension
reforms and 42% mentioned sustainability as a reason, Hewitt
(2007). In the UK, 88% of DB schemes were open to new members
in 2000 but by 2011 this had dropped to 19%, NAPF (2012). Shifting
from DB to DC addresses sustainability issues, but shifts all risks to
the beneficiaries. To mitigate risks DC plans typically offer some
type of guarantee. In the core DB, the provider commits to a set of
rigid promises and takes all the risk. A plain vanilla DC guarantees
the nominal value of the contribution.
However, we are not restricted to a binary classification and
hybrid forms met with success in Sweden, Denmark or Holland.
Hybrid schemes come with a variety of guarantees, such as areturn guarantee on the pension pot but no guarantee an what
that will buy in terms of income. From the Hewitt survey 50%
of the plans were DB, 32% DC and 18% hybrid. From the NAPFA
data 8% define themselves as hybrid. In a paper pricing the cost of
public pension liabilities in the US, Biggs (2011) uses the database
from the National Association of State Retirement Administrators
covering 125 mostly state-level programs and finds that around
80% of the employees have a DB pension, 14% DC and 6% have both.
Fig. 1 illustrates the prevalence of DC and hybrid plans in OECD
countries.
Guarantees come in various forms, see, e.g., Antolín et al. (2011).
There are significant legislative differences among countries on
who backs the guarantee, such as the Government, the provider,
a public pension protection fund, a collective DC trust and so on.
We define a risk sharing ladder based on the level of protection to
the beneficiary and the risks to the provider:
Rung 1. Money-safe accounts, that guarantee the contribution,
either in nominal or real value upon retirement.
Rung 2. Guaranteed return plans, that guarantee a fixed rate of
return on contribution, upon retirement.
Rung 3. Guaranteed return to match some industry average upon
retirement.
Rung 4. Guaranteed return for each time period until retirement.
Rung 5. Guaranteed income past retirement.
Note an important distinction between the first four and the
fifth level of protection. The first four provide the beneficiary
with guarantees on level of wealth attained upon retirement
while the fifth guarantees retirement income. Of course, wealth
accumulation provides the means to buy an income upon
retirement, but the connection between the two is not trivial. Plans
with the first four levels of protection are focusing on the volatility
of assets and returns rather than the risk of not realizing inflation-
protected incomes. The ‘‘Defined Ambitions’’ debate climbs this
risk ladder, offering some protection in the form of guarantees and
some in the form of soft guarantees (ambitions).
Deciding how far to climb the risk ladder offers possibilities
for risk-sharing, but this requires fair valuation of the risks. For
instance, if the employer – or a public protection fund or a
collective trust – provides asset volatility insurance for the retirees,
the insurance premium should be determined ex-ante and priced
using the markets. Risk transfers should be valued on a mark-to-
market basis and whoever underwrites the guarantee – employer,
future taxpayers or members of a collective trust – must be
compensated (NAPF, 2012, pp. 25–30). We turn therefore to the
pricing literature.
1.3. Pricing and asset management literature
A minimum guarantee clause can be modeled as a put option
written on an underlying reference portfolio of assets whose
returns determine the return on the contribution. Valuation
of the guarantee option has attracted significant interest from
academics and practitioners. The seminal papers, developed
independently and simultaneously, are Pennacchi (1999) and
Fischer (1999). Pennacchi used continuous martingale theory to
price the guarantees offered in Uruguay and Chile, respectively;
these lie on the second and third rung of our risk ladder.
Fischer values Colombia’s guarantees using a discrete martingale
model and obtained qualitatively similar results to Pennacchi. An
interesting feature of Fischer’s model is the existence of a ceiling
on the guarantee. Pennacchi recognized the similarity between
pension guarantees and insurance participating products with
embedded options, as priced by Brennan and Schwartz (1979);
Boyle and Hardy (1997), see also Embrechts (2000). Advances in
this field generated numerous studies extending the framework to
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Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932908079.more general stochastic processes, see, e.g., Coleman et al. (2007);
Consiglio and De Giovanni (2010), but they apply to insurance
products where the obligation has significant differences from the
pension obligation.
There is also literature on pricing the cost of benefit guarantees
in DB plans. This is the cost to the public entity (e.g., Public Benefits
Guarantee Corporation) that may have to step in to resolve a
failing DB plan. This problem is different than the one facing the
management of DC plans, as pointed out by Fischer. A discussion of
the cost of different types of guarantees, focusing on policy instead
of pricing models is Smetters (2002). Options pricing for public
pension liabilities is given in Biggs (2011), who used data from
State governments in the US to find that public pension shortfalls
equal an average of 27% of State GDP; this finding provides a
compelling argument for shifting towards DC.
A limitation of current literature is in assuming given the
underlying reference portfolio. However, the construction of a
reference portfolio is endogenous to the problem. Recognizing
this limitation Bacinello (2003) reports sensitivity analyses to
different model parameters, that would correspond to different
asset portfolios.
An alternative strand of literature focuses on the problem of
asset and liability management (ALM). The handbook Zenios and
Ziemba (2007) contains papers for Dutch (ch. 18) and Swiss (ch. 20)
pension funds, the Russell–Yasuda–Kasai model for insurance as
adapted for pension funds (ch. 19) and a paper for simultaneously
determining asset allocation and contribution rates (ch. 21). These
papers follow a parallel stream of ALM models for the insurance
industry, such as the seminal model developed for Japanese
insurance, the Russell–Yasuda–Kasai model of Carinõ and Ziemba
(1998) and the Towers Perrin model of Mulvey et al. (2000).
In the context of ALM for insurance products with guarantees,
the problem of structuring the reference portfolio was formulated
as a stochastic programme in the PROMETEIA model, see ch. 15
in the handbook, and was applied to UK and Italian policies,
Consiglio et al. (2006, 2008). This model addressed an important
issue since the liabilities from the guarantee – with the associated
bonus payments – depend on the asset portfolio, but while itextended ALM literature to account for guarantees it did not price
the guarantee per se.
In this paper we endogenize the decision about the reference
portfolio in a model for pricing the guarantee. We provide a model
that extends the line of research started by Fischer–Pennacchi
to select a reference portfolio that minimizes the cost of the
guarantee. The cost is obtained using option pricing theory on
a discrete tree. The model setup is innovative in two aspects.
First, it integrates portfolio optimization and option pricing in a
unified framework that is computationally tractable. Second, it
provides a strategic tool to compare alternative guarantee designs
to a yardstick reference portfolio with minimal guarantee costs,
thereby facilitating risk sharing. The model is tractable for large-
scale instances.
2. The model setup
We assume that asset returns are stochastic processes in
discrete space and time. The set of asset returns is labeled by index
set J = {1, 2, . . . , J} and are observed at finite time instances
t ∈ T , where T = {1, 2, . . . , T }:
R =

R1t , . . . , R
J
t
T
t=1
. (1)
The return process is modeled on the probability space
(Ω,F , P), where the sample space Ω is assumed to be finite.
Such a formulation allows for a market representation through
scenario trees, Pliska (1997). We denote by Nt the set of nodes at
t , and by N ≡ Tt=0Nt the collection of all the nodes. Each node
n ∈ Nt corresponds one-to-one to an atom of the filtration Ft .
(For simplicity, whenever we refer from now on to a node n, it is
understood to be a node from the set Nt for all t , unless specified
otherwise.) These are possible future states of the economy at time
t . Not all nodes at t can be reached from every node at t−1 andwe
define paths from the root node 0 to some final node in the set NT
to denote the unique way of reaching a particular node. Each path
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is a scenario.1 A graphical representation of a tree is given in Fig. 2,
for an example with 12 scenarios, two possible states at t = 1,
three possible states at t = 2 and six at t . We denote by P (n) the
set of nodes on the unique path from the root node to n ∈ Nt but
excluding the root node itself, by p(n) the unique predecessor node
for n, with p(0) being empty, and by S(n) ⊂ Nt the non-empty set
of successor nodes. Each successor node is associatedwith aweight
qn, interpreted as a probability. Given n, all information contained
in pathP (n) is known.Without ambiguity we drop the time index
when referring to data at a node, since each node n takes values
from a time-indexed setNt .
2.1. The basic minimum guarantee option
We assume that a DC fund guarantees a payment at maturity T .
The price of this guarantee is contingent on the value of a reference
fund An for each n ∈ NT . In the basic model we assume a closed
fundwith initial total contribution L0. Typically, there will be some
regulatory equity,2 such as E0 = (1 − α)A0 and α < 1, so that
L0 = αA0. The initial endowment A0 = L0 + E0 is invested in
a reference portfolio according to the asset allocation variables xj,
j∈J xj = 1.
Given the family of stochastic processes {Rt}t∈T , defined as a J-
dimensional vector of returns, Rn ≡

R1n, . . . , R
J
n

, the stochastic
process of the asset value {An} is driven by the stochastic process
of the portfolio return

RAn

for each n ∈ N \ {0} as follows:
An = Ap(n)eRAn , (2)
RAn =

j∈J
xjRjn, (3)
where Ap(n) is the asset value at the predecessor node. The main
difference with the models reviewed earlier is that the reference
portfolio performance depends on asset allocation decisions xj.
The liability process {Ln} also grows at a stochastic rate that, at
each node n ∈ N \{0}, is guaranteed not to be less than aminimum
guarantee rate g . That is,
RLn = max

δRAn − g, 0
+ g, (4)
1 Monte Carlo simulations can also be represented through scenario trees. In such
a case, the trees are scenario fans and each non-final node has only one successor.
2 EU Directive 2009/138/EC known as ‘‘Solvency II’’, becoming effective in
January 2016, sets forth rigorous regulatory requirements for insurance and re-
insurance, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:02009L0138-20140523&from=EN. No similar directive is yet in place for
pension funds but for generality of the model we introduce the initial equity
parameter.where δ is the participation rate and denotes the fraction of risky
returnwhich is passed to the beneficiary. Typically δwould be 1net
management fees. It can be set to lower values to compensate the
fund for the offered guarantee, by keeping a fraction of the portfolio
upside to compensate for providing a guarantee in a downturn.
The stochastic process of the liability is given, for all n ∈ N \{0},
by
Ln = Lp(n) exp

g +max δRAn − g, 0 , (5)
where Lp(n) is the liability value at the predecessor node. For
simplicity we ignore the effect of mortality on the liability process.
This can be accommodated by introducing an intensity based
model, where the survival probability at node n is a deterministic
function of time, or by fitting a stochastic mortality process to the
scenario tree.
3. The optimization model
Wenow formulate themathematical program to determine the
optimal composition of the reference portfolio, and show how to
reduce its complexity.
3.1. The objective function
Denote by Φ(An, Ln) the payoff function measuring the
performance of the portfolio strategy at each final node n. An and
Ln are implicit functions of the asset allocation xj, and according to
options theory the price of this contingent payoff is given by
Γ = e−rT

n∈NT
qnΦ(An, Ln), (6)
where the expectation is discounted at the risk free rate r , and is
taken under the risk-neutral measure. In our discrete probabilistic
setting these are the weights qn, n ∈ NT .
To write the objective function, we first specify the payoff
functionΦ(An, Ln). A natural choice is
Φ(An, Ln) = max (Ln − An, 0) , (7)
that implicitly assumes that shareholders cover possible shortfalls
at each state. A rationale strategy for DC fund management is to
minimizing the expected value of these losses. Substituting in (6)
we obtain
Γ = e−rT

n∈NT
qn max (Ln − An, 0) . (8)
This is the cost of a put option written on the value of the assets An
with a stochastic strike price Ln, i.e., it is the cost of the guarantee.
This cost can be considered as the fair risk premium charged by
a pensions guarantee agency to the fund, to set minimum equity
requirements by a regulator, to determine charges to the internal
sub-division operating the specific DC fund, or to determine
prices for risk-sharing between the beneficiary and the fund. The
guarantee option contributes to the total risk of the company
and minimizing its value is consistent with enterprise-wide risk
management.
3.2. The bilinear constraints
The variables affecting the cost of the guarantee (8) are the
values of the asset and liability accounts at T . We denote by wn
and zn, respectively, the final cumulative returns of the asset and
liability accounts An and Ln. For all n ∈ NT , we have that:
wn =

i∈P (n)
RAi , (9)
zn =

i∈P (n)
g +max δRAi − g, 0 . (10)
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discontinuous nonlinear programmingmodel (DNLP), thusmaking
the optimization model intractable for large-scale applications.
To solve the DNLP we reformulate it as an equivalent smooth
non-linear program. We can write the first argument of the max
operator as the difference of two positive variables with the
condition that only one of them is non-zero. Thus, for all n ∈
N \ {0}, we introduce the following set of equations:
δRAn − g = ε+n − ε−n , (11)
ε+n ε
−
n = 0, (12)
ε+n , ε
−
n ≥ 0. (13)
The bilinear constraints (12) still add complexity that is difficult
to deal with when we wish to solve models with a large number of
nodes on the tree. However, we prove in the next section that it is
not necessary to explicitly add constraints (12).
Given Eq. (11), we rewrite the definitional Eq. (10) as follows:
zn = g T +

i∈P (n)
ε+i . (14)
With this notation, the final value of assets and liabilities is given
by
An = A0 ewn , (15)
Ln = αA0 ezn , (16)
for each node n ∈ NT , and recall that L0 = αA0.
We also need to reduce the complexity introduced by the max
operator of the payoff function (7). To do so, we must handle the
exponentiation terms ofwn and zn. Let us consider the generic nth
term of the summation in Eq. (8). Using (15)–(16) for An and Ln, we
obtain:
max (Ln − An, 0) = An

max

Ln
An
, 1

− 1

= A0 ewn

max

αezn−wn , 1
− 1 . (17)
If a, b > 0, then max(a, b) = emax(ln a,ln b) and we write the last
term in (17) as
A0 ewn

emax(lnα+zn−wn,0) − 1 . (18)
We can now redefine themax operator as a set of constraints by
writing its first argument as the difference of two positive variables
lnα + zn − wn = H+n − H−n , (19)
H+n H
−
n = 0, (20)
H+n ,H
−
n ≥ 0, (21)
and expression (18) becomes
A0 ewn

eH
+
n − 1

. (22)
The bilinear equations (20) also lead to intractable optimization
problems, but as we will prove later these constraints also need
not be added explicitly.
Given (22), the cost of the guarantee (8) becomes:
Γ (x1, x2, . . . , xJ) = e−rTA0

n∈NT
qnewn

eH
+
n − 1

. (23)
We now show that (23) is a convex function of the portfolio
choices xj.
Proposition 1. The function Γ is a convex function of the portfolio
choices xj, j ∈ J.Proof. By the definitions ofH+n andwn, it is easy to show that these
quantities are affine functions of xj, j ∈ J, then ewn and

eH
+
n − 1

are convex functions of xj, j ∈ J. Since ewn and

eH
+
n − 1

are
increasing and non-negative functions of wn and Hn, then their
product is convex. Finally, given that the coefficients qn, n ∈
NT , are probabilities, then Γ is a linear combination of convex
functions and it is also convex. 
3.3. Convex model for minimizing the cost of guarantee option
If bilinear equations (12) and (20) are omitted, the remaining
constraints are linear. Moreover, given the convexity of the
objective function, the minimization of the cost of the guarantee
is a convex programming problem. In convex optimization if
a local minimum exists then it is a global minimum, and
effective computational methods are available, even for large scale
instances. Hence, the portfolio which minimizes the cost of the
guarantee option is obtained as the solution to the following
convex non-linear program:
Problem 1 (Convex Optimization of the Guarantee Option).
Minimize
x1,...,xJ
e−rTA0

n∈NT
qnewn

eH
+
n − 1

(24)
s.t.
lnα + zn − wn = H+n − H−n , n ∈ NT , (25)
δRAn − g = ε+n − ε−n , n ∈ N \ {0}, (26)
zn = g T +

i∈P (n)
ε+i , n ∈ N \ {0}, (27)
wn =

i∈P (n)
RAi , n ∈ N \ {0}, (28)
RAn =

j∈J
xjRjn, n ∈ N \ {0}, (29)
j∈J
xj = 1, (30)
H+n ,H
−
n ≥ 0, n ∈ NT , (31)
ε+n , ε
−
n ≥ 0, n ∈ N \ {0}, (32)
xj ≥ 0, j ∈ J. (33)
To establish the validity of this model we need to prove that the
minimum value of the objective function of Problem 1, coincides
with that of the non-convex problem obtained by adding the
nonlinear equations (12) and (20) to the constraints set (25)–(33).
Lemma 1. Let us assume that x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J is an optimal portfolio
choice for Problem 1. Then,
H+n H
−
n = 0,
for all n ∈ NT .
Proof. We will prove the lemma by negating the thesis and
showing that this contradicts the hypothesis that x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J is
a minimum of Problem 1.
Let us assume that there exists a k ∈ NT such that H+k H−k > 0.
Wedefine λ = min(H+k ,H−k ). Since λ > 0, subtracting λ from both
H+k and H
−
k will keep the non-negativity of both variables, modify
the objective function, and leave unaffected the rest of variables
and constraints.
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after we have subtracted λ from H+k and H
−
k . We have
Γ (λ) = e−rTA0

n∈NT
n≠k
qnewn

eH
+
n − 1

+ qkewk

eH
+
k −λ − 1
 .
By simple algebra, it is possible to show that the change in the
optimal objective function due to λ,1Γ = Γ (λ)− Γ (λ | λ = 0),
is given by
1Γ = e−rTA0 qk ewkeH+k

e−λ − 1 .
We observe that 1Γ < 0 since

e−λ − 1 < 0 and the
other terms are all positive. Therefore, the objective function can
be further reduced, but this contradicts the main hypothesis that
x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J is a minimum for Problem 1. Hence, the assumption
that there exists a k such that H+k H
−
k > 0 must be false. 
Remark 1. Lemma 1 only ensures that if an optimal solution of
Problem 1 exists, then (20) holds for all n ∈ NT . To claim that
such a minimum coincides with that of the non-convex problem,
we have to prove that at theminimumof Problem1 also conditions
(12) hold. If the latter result is true, since the objective function is
convex, and therefore the minimum level of the objective function
is unique,we can conclude that theminimumof the convex and the
non-convex problem are the same. In general, however, this is not
true for the optimal portfolio x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J . Only strict convexity of
the objective function implies uniqueness of the optimal portfolio
choices.
Lemma 2. Let us assume that x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J is an optimal portfolio
choice for Problem 1. Then, it exists a non empty subset of nodes
B ⊂ N such that for all n ∈ B we have
ε+n ε
−
n = 0.
Proof. Let us assume that for all n ∈ N wehave ε+n ε−n > 0. Denote
by ξ = min {ε+n }n∈N ∪ {ε−n }n∈N  and subtract ξ from ε+n and ε−n ,
for all n ∈ N . Such a subtraction will affect the objective function
value and the constraints (25). We define by λ = ξ T the total
change in the left-hand-side of the constraints set (25), where T
is the number of time steps. In particular, we have
lnα + zn − λ− wn = H+n (λ)− H−n (λ), for all n ∈ NT .
The effect of λ is counterbalanced by a change in the variables
H+n andH−n . By Lemma 1, we have thatH+n H−n = 0 at the optimum.
Let us assume that the change due to λ preserves such a property,
and therefore, H+n (λ)H−n (λ) = 0, for all n ∈ NT . The final nodes
are then partitioned as follows:
a. if H+n > λ, then H+n (λ) = H+n − λ and H−n (λ) = 0, for all
n ∈ N aT ⊂ NT ;
b. if H+n > 0 and H+n ≤ λ, then H+n (λ) = 0 and H−n (λ) ≥ 0, for all
n ∈ N bT ⊂ NT ;
c. if H−n > 0, then H−n (λ) = H−n + λ and H+n (λ) = 0, for all
n ∈ N cT ⊂ NT .
The objective function Γ (λ) is then partitioned accordingly3 as
Γ (λ) =

n∈N aT
qnewn

eH
+
n −λ − 1

+

n∈N bT
qnewn

e0 − 1+ 
n∈N cT
qnewn

e0 − 1 ,
3 We drop the constant term e−rTA0 for better readability.and the change in the optimal objective function, 1Γ = Γ (λ) −
Γ (λ | λ = 0), is given by
1Γ =

n∈N aT
qnewneH
+
n

eλ − 1− 
n∈N bT
qnewn

eH
+
n − 1

.
Observe that1Γ < 0 since it is made up by two negative terms
(the summation over the set of nodes N cT is not displayed as it
has a null impact in the total change of the objective function).
This contradicts the hypothesis that x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J is an optimal
portfolio choice for Problem 1, and then, for each k ∈ B it must
be that ε+k ε
−
k = 0, whereB is the union of the nodes belonging to
P (n), with n ∈ N aT ∪N bT . In symbol:
B =

n∈N aT ∪N bT
P (n).  (34)
Remark 2. A further result following from Lemma 2 is that, at the
optimum, the set of nodes k ∈ B correctly defines the expression
max

δRAn − g, 0

since ε+n ε−n = 0. Moreover, they belong to paths
that lead to final nodes characterized by H+n ≥ 0. This implies that
the optimal objective function valueΓ ∗ is correctly computed. The
rest of the nodes k ∈ N \B, where themax operator is not properly
defined since it might occur that ε+n ε−n > 0, belong to paths
leading to final nodes for which H−n is surely greater than zero (or
at most H−n = H+n = 0), thus making null their contribution in the
computation of Γ ∗.
Corollary 1. Let x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J be an optimal portfolio choice
for Problem 1, if ε+k ε
−
k > 0, for any k ∈ N , then it exists n ∈ NT
such that k ∈ P (n) and
H−n > 0 or H
−
n = H+n = 0.
We now assemble the above results to prove that solving
Problem 1 is equivalent to solving the same problem with the
additional non-convex constraints (12) and (20).
Theorem 1. Let x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
J be an optimal portfolio choice
for Problem 1, with optimal objective value Γ ∗. Let x∗∗1 , x
∗∗
2 , . . . , x
∗∗
J
be an optimal portfolio choice of Problem1with the non-convex equa-
tions (12) and (20) included, with optimal objective value Γ ∗∗. Then
Γ ∗ = Γ ∗∗.
Proof. Lemma 1 ensures that the conditions H+n H−n = 0 holds for
all n ∈ NT . Lemma 2 implies that the conditions ε+k ε−k = 0 only
hold partially (for all k ∈ B). However, by Corollary 1we can claim
that if ε+k ε
−
k > 0 then k ∈ Pn, i.e. the path leading to H−n > 0. So,
even if max

δRAk − g, 0

is not properly defined, its contribution to
the value ofΓ ∗ is nil. Finally, the convexity of the objective function
implies that its optimal value is unique, hence, Γ ∗ = Γ ∗∗. 
3.4. Extensions
The model was formulated for Rung 4 of the risk ladder
described in the introduction, but it can be modified to represent
the other rungs. Some extensions are straightforward while others
aremore elaborate and are only sketched here for further research.
Rung 1. For money-safe accounts we eliminate Eq. (4) from the
model. The stochastic process of the liability is simplified
to
Ln = Lp(n) exp

RAn

, (35)
and constraints Ln ≥ L0 are added for each terminal node
n ∈ NT . The resulting model is a simplified version of the
model developed above.
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Eq. (4), use the simplified liability process (35), and add
constraints for each terminal node n ∈ NT :
Ln ≥ gLL0. (36)
The resulting model is also a simplified version of the
model developed above.
Rung 3. To deliver the industry average upon retirement, replace
g by gLn in Eq. (36), where gLn is the state-dependent in-
dustry average. Implementation of this model requires
estimates of the industry portfolio returns. Given scenar-
ios of returns on the tree, this information is computed
from the composition of industry portfolios. The model
is structurally identical to the one developed in this pa-
per but has additional data requirements.
Rung 4. This is the type of guarantee alreadymodeled. One signif-
icant extension is to open funds, whereby contributions
In are made to the fund at t = 2, 3, . . . , T . This is trivially
modeled on the liability side by rewriting the stochastic
process as:
Ln = Lp(n) exp

g +max δRAn − g, 0+ In. (37)
The contributionsmust also be accounted for on the asset
side. A simple approach is to assume that incremental
contributions are invested proportionately with the
original portfolio. A more realistic approach is to
rebalance the portfolio as new contributions arrive.
The model setup on a multi-period tree permits the
extension. Indeed, an advantage of the model is that
it extends to multi-period optimization; this is an
active research area, Zenios (2007), and has been used
successfully in the ALM literature cited earlier. However,
the linearizations developed in this paper need to be re-
worked.
Rung 5. To model guarantee income past retirement the model
needs a past-retirement horizon T ′ > T . The asset at
each state n of the retirement horizon T can then be used
to finance income for all nodes emanating from n un-
til T ′, and lower bounds imposed on what this income
would be. However, it is not clear what additional non-
linearities may be introduced with this extension and
how to linearize them. Also,multi-factor trees are needed
to calibrate risk-neutral probabilities of financial vari-
ables together with objective probabilities of economic
variables to model inflation-adjusted income; such trees
are available, see, e.g., Consiglio et al. (in press) and Mul-
vey (1996).
4. Implementation and results
We run experiments for T = 30 years and J = 12 financial
asset indices. Without loss of generality – and appropriately in
the current economic environment – we set the risk free rate
r = 0. The indices represent the broad asset classes of sovereign
bonds, corporate bonds and stocks; see Appendix. We simulate
the risk-neutral process of asset returns using a standard Monte
Carlo approach. The variance–covariance matrix is estimated from
the monthly historical series of the indices. The yearly equivalent
volatilities are obtained using the square root rule. All data are
summarized in the Appendix.
The model was implemented on a simulated fan of 1000
risk-neutral paths. The size of the scenario set is chosen to
limit computational times for the extensive experiments we
run. Problems with more scenarios are solvable with modestcomputer resources, and variance reduction techniques can reduce
sampling errors when using fewer scenarios. While we use a
simple scenario generation method, we point out that alternative
discrete representations, e.g., Geyer et al. (2010); Consiglio et al. (in
press); Høyland and Wallace (2001), can be readily implemented.
Themodel is tested for parameters α and δ in the range 0.7–1.0,
and g in 0–5%.
4.1. The effect of policy parameters on the cost of the guarantee
The relationship between the cost of the guarantee Γ ∗ and the
guarantee rate g is shown in Fig. 3. Within each panel, we display
the effect of the parameter α on the cost, where higher values
correspond to less equity and for α = 1 there is no equity. Each
panel corresponds to different participation rate δ. The lower the
δ the higher is the proportion of portfolio upside kept by fund
management and this reduces the cost of the guarantee, especially
for higher guarantees and lower equity. Fig. 4 shows the changes in
the cost of the guarantee for varying participation rates, for g = 3%
and equity 0 and 0.3.
We now focus on the effect of α. This parameter controls risk
sharing, as it determines the amount of equity, which can be
viewed as regulatory requirement for solvency. For fixed δ = 0.9
we show in Fig. 5 the cost of different guarantees as α varies from
0.7 to 1.0. The cost of the guarantee increases with the guarantee,
but this increase is lower for lower α, i.e., for more equity. This
result is intuitive. By reducing α we increase the fraction of equity
which composes the initial endowment A0. Moreover, from Eq.
(16), we observe that the final liability is due only on a fraction α of
the initial value of the reference fund, A0. Hence, as α decreases, an
increasing part of the guarantee cost, given by (Ln − An)+, is borne
by the equity-holders.
The curves in Fig. 5 trace the tradeoff between the option cost
and the minimum guarantee. For a fixed value of α, the points
on each curve determine a Pareto frontier. For any guarantee rate
g the option cost is at its minimum and, given the convexity of
the objective function (see Proposition 1), this value is unique.
These curves can be used as a yardstick to assess how effective is
a given reference portfolio vis-a-vis those on the efficient frontier
and regulators can assess the risk of each fund. For instance,
Solvency II regulations require embeddedoptions to bemarked-to-
market, and, given the universe of the assets that characterizes the
fund’s reference portfolio, a shift away from the optimal portfolio
is a warning for potentially failed commitments that should be
monitored by regulators. This point is elaborated next.
4.2. Portfolio composition and moral hazard
The portfolio compositions for α set to 0.7 and 0.9, and for
changing levels of guaranteed return, are shown in Fig. 6. In all
instances, the largest proportion is allocated in asset BONDS_1_3
of sovereign bonds with maturities less than 3 years; this is the
asset with the lowest volatility, see Table 1.
This allocation is the consequence of the minimum guarantee
mechanism. Whenever there is a downside deviation from the
guarantee, the liability will increase by a function of g and of the
prior, compounded, performances. At the same time, the asset
account will perform worse than the guarantee, and its value
could turn out to be less than the value of the liability implying
insolvency. This is illustrated in Fig. 7, where four panels show
the dynamics of assets and liabilities for g = 3% and α =
δ = 0.9. We consider three asset classes, respectively, the
S&P500, the 3-month T-Bill and the 10-year T-Bond, and
consider three reference portfolios corresponding to each asset
class, plus a portfolio with weights 0, 0.9 and 0.1, respectively.
274 A. Consiglio et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 65 (2015) 267–279Fig. 3. Effect of guaranteed rate g on the cost of the guarantee Γ ∗ for different levels of equity requirements (1− α). The values of participation rate δ are indicated in the
strip above each panel.Table 1
Yearly volatilities.
Index name Volatility
BONDS-1-3 2.03E−02
BONDS-3-5 3.06E−02
BONDS-5-7 4.13E−02
BONDS-7-10 4.76E−02
CORP-FIN 4.26E−02
CORP-ENE 5.27E−02
CORP-INS 5.56E−02
STOCKS_EMU 1.89E−01
STOCKS-EX-EMU 1.47E−01
STOCKS-PAC 1.76E−01
STOCKS-EMER 2.29E−01
STOCKS-NA 1.35E−01
The yearly returns of the four portfolios are shown in Fig. 8.4
Although S&P500 outperforms the minimum guarantee rate, its
high volatility leads to a situation in which the final asset value
is well below the guaranteed liability. More suitable reference
portfolios are obtained by allocating the initial capital over asset
classes with low volatilities, or their combination, as shown in
Fig. 7 and confirmed by the portfolio results in Fig. 6.
The average asset allocations from our model are 89% govern-
ment bonds, 9% corporates and 2% stocks. By comparison, the av-
erage State pension portfolios reported in Biggs (2011) has 58%
stocks, 26% bonds, 5% real estate, 2% cash and 9% other. There is
significantly more exposure to risky assets in the funds studied
by Biggs, compared to the optimal reference portfolio. We use the
model to benchmark State pension fund practices. We assume a
portfolio of our universe of assets of the same broad asset alloca-
tion as the State funds: 60% stocks, 35% bonds and 5% cash, and use
the model to price the cost of the guarantee; see Fig. 9.
Comparing the frontiers of the State sponsored portfolios, with
those of the optimized reference fund we observe significantly
higher costs for the guarantee of the former. It is not surprising
that Biggs finds funding ratios of 45% and concludes that the
4 Data available from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/∼adamodar/pc/datasets/
histretSP.xls. The example is illustrative of the mechanism governing the DC
with guaranteed returns. We do not draw any conclusion about the value of the
guarantee option that must be addressed under a risk neutral measure.Fig. 4. Effect of participation rate δ on the cost of a 3% guarantee for different levels
of equity requirements (1− α).
Fig. 5. Effect of guaranteed rate g on the cost of the guarantee Γ ∗ for different
values of equity requirements (1 − α). Cost increases with the guarantee, but
increase is lower for lower α, i.e., more equity.
A. Consiglio et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 65 (2015) 267–279 275Fig. 6. Portfolios are mostly composed of low volatility securities. Participation rate is set δ = 0.9 and α is set to 0.7 and 0.9 as shown in the strip above each panel.Fig. 7. An illustrative example of the dynamics of assets and liabilities of a DC fund with 3% guaranteed return. Results based on historical data of three asset classes and a
portfolio with weightsw1 = 0, w2 = 0.9 andw3 = 0.1. The less volatile assets and the portfolio better meet the guarantee, consistently with the findings of our model.
276 A. Consiglio et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 65 (2015) 267–279Fig. 8. Historical returns of the three assets and the portfolio assumed to be the reference fund of DC fund. The horizontal line denotes the 3% guarantee.Fig. 9. The cost of the guarantee of the State pension funds using some benchmark portfolios from Biggs (2011) against optimized reference portfolio.
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278 A. Consiglio et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 65 (2015) 267–279typical State has significant unfundedpublic pension liabilities. The
differences of cost between the actual and the optimized reference
portfolios is a signal ofmoral hazard. The State guarantees the fund
and will have to cover any shortfalls, while the funds take risky
positions andpass the upside to the beneficiaries. This could also be
a strategy of ‘‘gambling for redemption’’: underfunded funds take
a big gamble hoping for the big upswing.
4.3. Risk sharing
The cost of the guarantee can be used to set risk sharing
premiums. From the example of Fig. 5 we obtain for g = 3% and
α = 1 (zero equity) a cost of 0.84. There are three possible ways to
share this cost, depending on the risk sharing arrangements:
1. The pension fund bears the risk of the guarantee. Under this
arrangement, the fund will charge the beneficiary – or the
employer, or the government – the cost of the option. Hence,
the beneficiary will pay 1.84 and will get a return only on 1
euro, since the 0.84 is the cost of the option. Probably this is
not viable, because 3% guarantee is impossible, but the charge
is fair. (Of course, since they bear the risk, they have to hedge
the option, otherwise they will loose money, or default, even if
they get the option premium.)
2. There is risk sharing between the beneficiary and a third party—
such as the employer or the government. Let us assume that
the sharing consist in paying 0.3 of equity (α = 0.7), and
investing it in the reference portfolio. We note from the figure
that now the cost of the guarantee is 0.09, which can be charged
to the employee. The pension fund will bear the option risk,
but the cost is significantly lower than the previous risk sharing
scheme. Again they have to hedge the option but the advantage
is clear: instead of paying 0.89 for each euro invested in the
asset portfolio, there will be a total cost of 0.39 (equity plus cost
of the option).
We can also take the regulators’ view. Let us assume that a
pension fund pursues a very aggressive marketing policy (a kind
of dumping) promising g = 3%. Then, the regulators should ask
the pension fund to invest 0.3 from shareholders capital in the risky
portfolio, and, at the same time, hedge the option. The lattermeans
that in subsequent years the cost of the option must be covered by
enough capital. Hence, the fund is ‘‘penalized’’ with a fair amount
of capital requirement to account for the generous guarantee it
promises.
5. Conclusions
This paper develops a general and computationally tractable
model for pricing the cost of alternative embedded guarantee
options in DC pension funds. The model determines the asset
allocation choice that is optimal for a given guarantee, in that it
minimizes the cost of the guarantee. Themodel is tested using real-
world data to illustrate the effect of the design parameters of the
guarantee on the cost of offering the option.
Results illustrate the effect on the option of (1) level of
guarantee, (2) amount of equity, and (3) participation of the
beneficiaries in any portfolio upswing above the guarantee. We
also show how the model can be used to benchmark existing
portfolios by applying it to test portfolios of State and local
government pension funds from the literature. Our results are in
agreement with empirical findings of existing literature, but also
attribute the precise cost of the guarantee. We also show how the
model can be used to calculate risk premia for risk sharing.
The model we implement and test can be extended to cover
a broad range of guarantees that increasingly resemble DB, thus
providing a continuum of funds in the hitherto dichotomous
relation DC–DB. Some extensions are straightforward to build and
calibrate, while others are provided as areas for further research.Appendix. Indices, volatilities and correlations
To generate the risk neutral paths, we compute volatilities
and correlations of 12 indices, representing three broad classes:
sovereign bonds, corporate bonds and stocks. The data are ob-
tained from the GAMS/FINLIB library.5 We denote by BONDS-1-3,
BONDS-3-5,BONDS-5-7 andBONDS-7-10 the J.P.Morgan aggre-
gate indices of sovereign bonds issued by European countries with
the indicated maturity ranges. The corporate bond classes are Sa-
lomon indices – CORP-FIN, CORP-ENE and CORP-INS – of bonds
issued globally by financial, energy and insurance companies, re-
spectively. Stock market indices are the Morgan Stanley Capi-
tal International Global, partitioned according to geo-political ar-
eas: EMU markets STOCKS_EMU, non-EMU STOCKS-EX-EMU, Pa-
cific rim STOCKS-PAC, emerging economies STOCKS-EMER, and
North-American STOCKS-NA. We estimate volatilities and corre-
lations on 62monthly observations, from Feb. 1995 toMarch 2000.
Yearly volatilities are obtained by the square root rule (see Table 2).
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